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Abstract—Some recent work revealed that deep neural net-
works (DNNs) are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks
where input examples are intentionally perturbed to fool DNNs.
In this work, we revisit the DNN training process that includes
adversarial examples into the training dataset so as to improve
DNN’s resilience to adversarial attacks, namely, adversarial train-
ing. Our experiments show that different adversarial strengths,
i.e., perturbation levels of adversarial examples, have different
working ranges to resist the attacks. Based on the observation,
we propose a multi-strength adversarial training method (MAT)
that combines the adversarial training examples with different
adversarial strengths to defend adversarial attacks. Two training
structures—mixed MAT and parallel MAT—are developed to
facilitate the tradeoffs between training time and hardware cost.
Our results show that MAT can substantially minimize the
accuracy degradation of deep learning systems to adversarial
attacks on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN. The
tradeoffs between training time, robustness, and hardware cost
are also well discussed on a FPGA platform.
Index Terms—neural network, adversarial example, adversar-
ial attack, adversarial training, FPGA
I. INTRODUCTION
The most exciting advancement of artificial intelligence
in the past decade is the wide application of deep learning
techniques [1]. However, a recent research discovered that
machine learning models (including deep neural networks,
a.k.a. DNN) are susceptible to adversarial attacks, which
apply small perturbation on input data to fool the models.
Such attacks normally lead to a lower confidence level or
even a misclassification [2], [3]. In addition, Papernot et al.
discovered that a perturbed example (i.e., adversarial example)
has transferability property: the adversarial example crafted
by a model MS (i.e., substitute model) not only can deceive
MS itself but also can influence other models (i.e., victim
models), even without knowing the internal structures of these
victim models [4]. The amplitude of the perturbation that is
used in adversarial attacks (a.k.a. adversarial strength) can
be quite small or even imperceptible to the human eyes. All
these properties raise severe concerns on the security of deep
learning technique.
In this work, we revisit the recently emerged adversarial
training process that uses adversarial examples to train DNN
This work was supported in part by NSF 1744077 and AFRL ICA2017-
UP-018.
and therefore enhances its resilience to adversarial attacks. We
find that the adversarial examples with different adversarial
strengths work effectively only for the adversarial attacks
with certain range of adversarial strengths. Based on this
observation, we propose a multi-strength adversarial training
(MAT) method that defends adversarial attacks by combin-
ing adversarial training examples with multiple adversarial
strengths. Two adversarial training structures, namely, mixed
MAT and parallel MAT, are developed to integrate the influ-
ences of multiple adversarial strengths with different training
times and hardware costs. The proposed adversarial training
structures are also implemented on Xilinx FPGA ZC706 board
to evaluate their performances, hardware costs, and energy
consumptions and to explore the possible design space. Com-
pared to the existing works about adversarial attacks and their
defense schemes, our major contributions can be summarized
as follows:
• We identify the limitation on the working range of the
existing adversarial training technique against adversarial
attacks;
• We invent multi-strength adversarial training (MAT)—the
first adversarial training method that can enhance the re-
silience of learning systems over a controllable wide range
of adversarial length under adversarial attacks;
• We propose mixed MAT and parallel MAT to facilitate a
flexible tradeoff between training time and hardware cost;
• We implement a random walk algorithm to optimize the se-
lections of adversarial strengths and other design parameters
in the MAT process; and
• We also implement MATs with different configurations on
a FPGA platform and discuss the tradeoffs between training
time, robustness, and hardware cost.
Our experimental results on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100, and SVHN show that both mixed MAT and parallel
MAT can better defend the learning model under adversarial
attacks than single-strength adversarial training and parallel
MAT offers the largest accuracy improvement. The results
also show that the model robustness is greatly affected by
the complexity and size of the network structure, the training
dataset, the associated hardware cost, and training time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
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tion II gives preliminary about adversarial attacks and its de-
fense techniques; Section III introduces the motivation of our
work; Section IV presents the details of our proposed method;
Section V shows the experimental results and discussions;
Section VI concludes this work.
II. PRELIMINARY
A robust learning model is expected to be able to tolerate
random noises in input samples to certain degree [5]. However,
recent studies showed that the robustness of a learning model is
threatened by so called adversarial attacks [6]. To be specific,
a learning model may misclassify an example that is carefully
perturbed, say, an adversarial example, to a wrong class. An
adversarial example X˜ can be generated by injecting pertur-
bation ε to the original input sample X such as X˜ = X + ε.
The linear transformation of X˜ with respect to a given weight
vector W is
WT X˜ =WTX +WT ε. (1)
Here the adversarial perturbation ε is often referred to as
adversarial strength. WT X˜ increases proportionally with the
dimensionality of W . Since W is often high dimensional in
practical problems, a minor perturbation ε could introduce a
big change of WT X˜ . Such a small change may not be caught
visually or by a rule-based detection scheme but could be
sufficient to lead a misclassification in DNNs.
Some popular methods to defend adversarial attacks are:
• Gradient masking: Its main idea is to build a model to hide
or smooth the gradient between original and adversarial
examples [6]. The effectiveness of this method, however,
can significantly degrade when the attacker uses a model
different from the protected model to generate the adversar-
ial examples.
• Defensive distillation: The target of this method is to create
a model whose decision boundaries are smoothed along the
directions that the attacker may exploit. Defensive distilla-
tion makes it difficult for the attacker to discover adversarial
input tweaks that lead to incorrect classes.
• Adversarial training: The objective of adversarial training is
using adversarial examples to train the model and therefore
enhance its resilience to adversarial attacks. Its effectiveness
has been shown and explained by Goodfellow et al. [3]. Note
that in adversarial training, the model that is used to generate
the adversarial examples is not necessarily identical to the
model being attacked.
In some recent relevant research works, Kurakin et al. [7]
show that combining small batches of both adversarial ex-
amples and original data in adversarial training could make
the model more resilient to adversarial attacks. Carlini and
Wagner [8] demonstrate that defensive distillation does not
significantly enhance the robustness of neural networks in
some scenarios by introducing three new attack algorithms.
Cisse et al. [9] introduce a layer-wise regularization method to
reduce the neural networks sensitivity to small perturbations,
which are difficult to be visually caught. However, these work
do not give experimental guidance on how to adaptively select
Fig. 1: Robustness of the models trained with different adver-
sarial strengths.
the adversarial strength of the adversarial examples that are
used in adversarial trainings or attacks to maximize either
the defense or attack effectiveness. And to the authors’ best
knowledge, there is no work discusses the implementation on
hardware and hardware consumption.
III. MOTIVATION
It is known that training the DNN using adversarial exam-
ples with certain adversarial strength helps in improving the
DNNs resilience against adversarial attacks. Figure 1 compares
the robustness (overall accuracy performance in the interested
adversarial strength range) of a 6-layer neural network trained
with different datasets on MNIST. Here the original model
is trained with the original dataset, and the models of adv 5,
adv 10, and adv 15 are trained with half legitimate examples
and half adversarial examples with the adversarial strength
= 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15, respectively. As we can see from
the results, the model trained with the original dataset is
very susceptible to the increase of adversarial strength during
the adversarial attacks. However, including the adversarial
examples in the training process can effectively maintain the
model’s accuracy when the adversarial strength increases,
which aligns with the result in Goodfellow et al. [3].
In addition, Figure 1 shows that the accuracies of the
models trained with different adversarial strengths cross each
other over the simulated range of the adversarial strengths
adopted in the attacks. As we can see from the figure,
these models demonstrate different defending effectiveness on
different adversarial strength ranges. On the left side of point
a, for example, the model adv 5 demonstrates the highest
accuracy among all the trained models. As the adversarial
strength adopted in the attacks increases, the models adv 10
and adv 15 give the highest accuracy in turn. This observation
in fact reveals a limitation of the single strength adversarial
training: each adversarial strength of the samples used in the
adversarial training has its best working range, say, around the
same strength that is adopted in the attacks.
By leveraging the different working ranges of the different
adversarial strengths used in adversarial training, there exists
a possibility to develop a new adversarial training method that
can combine these working ranges so that the trained learning
system can be resilient to the attacks over a wide range of the
adversarial strength.
Fig. 2: Robustness comparison between the original, the
single-strength adversarial, and the mixed-strength adversarial
training.
Figure 2 shows our initial simulation results of the accuracy
of the models adversarially trained with different configura-
tions of the training dataset under the adversarial attacks with
different strengths. Similar to Figure 1, here model original
represents our baseline, which is trained with the original
dataset. Model single-strength is trained with half of the orig-
inal dataset and half of the adversarial examples generated by
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3]. Model mixed multi-
strength: reduced size is trained with a mixed combination
of the original dataset and the adversarial dataset with the
strengths of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15, respectively. The size of each
subset of the training data is 25% of the original dataset size.
Model mixed multi-strength: full size has the same partition of
all datasets as mixed multi-strength: reduced size does, but the
size of each subset of the data is the same as that of the original
dataset. Our simulation results show that model mixed multi-
strength: full size performs the best over a considerably large
range of the adversarial strength, indicating a great potential
of our proposal to combine the adversarial examples with
different strengths for robust model training. As we shall show
later, the selections of the adversarial strength levels and the
number of strengths are critical in our proposal. The results
also show that packing the data with different adversarial
strengths into the same size of the original dataset, i.e., as
model mixed multi-strength: reduced size, may not help much
to enhance the model’s resistance and may even degrade the
model accuracy. A possible mathematic explanation about why
combining multiple adversarial strengths during the adversarial
training helps in improving the resilience of the model to the
adversarial attacks is related to the construction of the decision
hyperspace during the training. Due to space limit, we do not
include this explanation in this paper.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In light of the limited working range of single-strength
adversarial training, in this work, we propose multi-strength
adversarial training (MAT) to combine the effects of multiple
adversarial strengths to improve the robustness of the neural
network over a wide adversarial strength range under adver-
sarial attack. Adversarial examples with different adversarial
strengths are mixed with the original training dataset in MAT.
The total size of the new training dataset N for MAT, hence,
becomes N = NC+S ·NA. Here NC is the size of the original
training dataset. NA is the size of the generated adversarial
dataset with a certain adversarial strength. S denotes the
number of the different adversarial strengths that are adopted
in MAT.
Two training structures, namely, mixed multi-strength ad-
versarial training (mixed MAT) and parallel multi-strength
adversarial training (parallel MAT), are proposed to facilitate
the tradeoff between the training time and the hardware cost
of MAT. Some automated optimization method, e.g., one-
dimensional random walk algorithm, can be used to select the
optimum adversarial strengths adopted in MAT. The details of
these techniques will be explained in this section.
A. Mixed MAT
Figure 3(a) illustrates the training structure of mixed MAT.
The new training dataset N , which includes the original train-
ing dataset and S generated adversarial datasets, are numbered
from 0 to S as the training input of the neural network. Here
number 0 represents the original training dataset. A modified
loss function of mixed MAT can be constructed as:
JM =
NC∑
i=1
J(θ, Xi, Ti) +
S∑
j=1
NA∑
i=1
J(θ, f(Xi), Ti). (2)
Here Xi is the i-th original example; Ti stands for the i-th
target value; f(·) is the function of adversarial transformation.
The new loss function JM contains two terms, which respec-
tively represent the original training part and the newly-added
adversarial training part with total S different adversarial
strengths. The interior sum of the second term denotes the loss
on every single strength adversarial dataset, while the exterior
sum denotes the overall loss of all the adversarial datasets with
different adversarial strengths.
Assume that the sizes of the original and the adversarial
dataset are identical, then the total training time of mixed
MAT will be (S+1) times of the original training time of the
neural network. During practical applications of mixed MAT,
however, the size of the used datasets may be reduced from
that of the original dataset to save the training time, by paying
the cost of possible model accuracy degradation. Nonetheless,
(a) Mixed MAT (b) Parallel MAT
Fig. 3: Our proposed structures of mixed MAT and parallel
MAT.
mixed MAT affects neither the computational complexity nor
the execution time of the testing process of the neural network.
The network structure is not changed either.
B. Parallel MAT
We need to point out that directly combining the adversarial
datasets with different adversarial strengths, i.e., in mixed
MAT, is not the only option to leverage the different working
ranges of these datasets. A more straightforward thinking is
that for a specific range of the adversarial strengths adopted by
an adversarial attack, we shall always train the neural network
with the adversarial dataset that ensures the highest model
accuracy under the attack, as illustrated in Figure 1. Following
this philosophy, we propose parallel MAT, the concept of
which is illustrated in Figure 3(b).
In parallel MAT, total S neural network copies can be
trained in parallel. Each of these copies is trained with the
combination of the original dataset and one of the adversarial
datasets with a certain adversarial strength. The overall size
of the new training dataset, hence, becomes 2S times of the
original dataset. Accordingly, the loss function of the k-th
(k = 1, 2, . . . , S) neural network copy is modified to:
JP,k =
NC∑
i=1
J(θ, Xi, Ti) +
NA∑
i=1
J(θ, f(Xi), Ti). (3)
Different from Eq. (2) where the effects of the original
dataset and all the adversarial datasets are taken into account
as a whole, Eq. (3) particularly focuses on the robustness
enhancement of the neural network over the working range of a
single adversarial dataset. The outputs (e.g., the loss functions
or the predicted possibilities) of all the neural copies are then
summarized in an upper-boundary decision unit (UDU), as
shown in Figure 3(b). The function of UDU v(·) is to collect
the outputs from all the DNN copies and then decide the
classification result by a voting process such as:
JP =
S∑
k=1
akv(JP,k), (4)
where ak is the coefficient of voting for the k-th neural
network copy v(JP,k) and satisfies
∑S
k=1 ak = 1. In the
implementation of parallel MAT, ak can be learned using a
shallow neural network.
Compared to mixed MAT, parallel MAT reduces the total
training time of the DNN by leveraging the computation
parallelism. However, the hardware implementation cost may
significantly increase in parallel MAT by replicating the neural
network. We note that in practice, the optimal numbers of
adversarial strengths adopted by mixed MAT and parallel MAT
are not necessarily the same.
C. Multi-strength Selection
We utilize one-dimensional random walk algorithm [10]
to automatically select the adversarial strengths adopted in
MATs. A random walk is a stochastic process that describes a
path formed by a succession of random steps on some math-
ematical space. The one-dimensional random walk algorithm
used in this paper includes the following three procedures:
• Pre-computation: An accuracy matrix A that contains the
average single-strength training accuracies in an adversarial
strength range is measured in the victim model and pro-
vided to the random walk function. Here we use validation
accuracy to approximate test accuracy by assuming that the
victim model cannot access the test dataset.
• Initialization: Based on the accuracy matrix A, the
multi-strength accuracy matrix AM can be estimated as
AM (i, j) = A(i, j)/
∑
(A(i)), where
∑
(A(i)) denotes the
sum of the i-th row of matrix A. According to AM , we
can calculate the state transition matrix P (A) when walking
from one single-strength state to another and initialize the
multi-strength accuracy estimation function H(·).
• Simulation: During the iterative simulation, we perform l-
step random walk for t times to estimate H(AM , l, t). To
limit the total number S of the selected adversarial strengths,
a penalty term with an coefficient a is added to calculate the
multi-strength accuracy estimation by using random walk
function, such as G(A, l, t) = H(AM , l, t) + a · S.
After exercising sufficient steps of random walk, G(·) will
give the best estimated accuracy that corresponds to an optimal
combination of multiple adversarial strengths represented by
AM . Such a selection method can be used in both mixed
MAT and parallel MAT, though they might start with different
accuracy matrices.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare mixed MAT and parallel MAT
with the single-strength adversarial training on four image
datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN. MNIST
consists of digits, and CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 consists of
natural scenes with different class numbers. SVHN is similar
to MNIST where each image is a street view house number. In
addition, we also implement these adversarial training schemes
with different configurations and discuss the relevant tradeoffs.
A. Experimental Setup
We use Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to craft both
training and testing datasets. The detailed model structure and
setting are described as follows:
Upper bound of adversarial strength: We use Mean Struc-
tural SIMilarity (MSSIM) index [11] to limit the maximum
value of the adversarial strength ε. MSSIM is a value between
-1 and 1 to measure the similarity between two images and
can be also used to describe the distortion of an image. In this
work, we set lower bound of the MSSIM between 0.77 and
0.82, which corresponds to a distortion that can be visually
captured.
MNIST: We use LeNet-5 with an accuracy of 99.5% to
craft adversarial examples. The range of adversarial strengths
ε is determined upon the following observation: by testing
adversarial examples with different adversarial strengths, we
find that as ε increases from 0 to 0.09, 0.15 and 0.30, the
corresponding MSSIM decreases from 1.00 to 0.94, 0.90 and
0.82. It implies ε ∈ [0, 0.3] will be enough for our evaluation.
Similar criteria are applied to other datasets.
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN: CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 use the same model to craft adversarial exam-
ples. The model contains 3 convolutional layers and 2 fully
connected layers. Each convolutional layer is followed by a
batch normalization layer and a max pooling layer. The orig-
inal accuracies of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are 82.7% and
54.3%, respectively. The adversarial CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 examples are generated in the adversarial strength range
of ε ∈ [0, 5], with a step size of 0.5. SVHN follows the same
procedure as that of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 in crafting
adversarial examples.
For victim model, we use a 3-layer multilayer perceptron
(MLP) for MNIST dataset, a convolutional neural network
(CNN) with 3 convolutional layers for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100, and SVHN. Here no data augmentation method (e.g.,
cropping or mirroring) is used in the training process. We
test every method on full adversarial test dataset in the
concerned adversarial strength range as aforementioned; In
every adversarial attack, we assume the test examples are
perturbation with the same adversarial strength.
B. Technology Comparisons
Figure 4 compares the effectiveness of four training schemes
on enhancing the model’s resilience to adversarial attacks,
including the original data training, the single-strength ad-
versarial training, and our proposed mixed MAT and parallel
MAT. For each sub-figure, the horizontal axis is the testing
adversarial strength, and the vertical axis is the model’s testing
accuracy. Each of them corresponds to one dataset, i.e., (a)
MNIST, (b) CIFAR-10, (c) CIFAR-100, and (d) SVHN.
Single-strength vs. Original. Single-strength adversarial
training achieves a better accuracy performance than the origi-
nal data training on adversarial examples, but has a lower accu-
racy on the original examples. Adversarial perturbation can be
understood as a specified distortion of the original examples.
Introducing random distortions or other data augmentation
methods in the training examples usually improves the training
accuracy because of the expansion of sample spaces. However,
in single-strength adversarial training, the adversarial examples
push the decision boundary towards other classes and may
lead to misclassification of some of the originally correctly-
classified samples.
Mixed/Parallel MAT vs. Single-strength. For all datasets,
parallel MAT generally achieves the highest accuracy over the
simulated adversarial strength range, and outperforms single-
strength adversarial training. Mixed MAT, however, demon-
strates a higher accuracy than single-strength adversarial train-
ing only over limited range of the adversarial strength on most
datasets. Both parallel and mixed MAT select the adversarial
strengths using random walk. The reason that parallel MAT
substantially outperforms mixed MAT is possibly because the
network structure of mixed MAT is not capable of learning
original and adversarial information very well simultaneously.
C. Performances on Different Datasets
MNIST and CIFAR-10 have similar amount of training and
testing examples but CIFAR-10 is more complex than MNIST
(a) MNIST
(b) CIFAR-10
(c) CIFAR-100
(d) SVHN
Fig. 4: Robustness of proposed MATs on different datasets.
as CIFAR-10 has RGB channels. As shown in Figure 4(a),
for MNIST, single-strength adversarial training is able to
compensate the accuracy loss decently. For CIFAR-10, the
baseline accuracy of the model trained with the original data
is 77.96%. Following the increase of adversarial strength, the
model accuracy drops steeply, e.g., down to 43.34% when ε is
merely 5. However, when single-strength adversarial training
is applied, the accuracy is restored back to 65%∼70% within
the simulated ε range. For SVHN, both MATs demonstrate
very impressive capability to enhance the model’s resilience
to adversarial attacks. The relevant results are summarized in
Table I.
TABLE I: Average test accuracy in the interested strength
range on different datasets.
Training Methods Original Single-strength
Mixed
MAT
Parallel
MAT
CIFAR-10 53.73% 65.86% 65.81% 75.35%
CIFAR-100 5.77% 45.27% 57.12% 61.94%
MNIST 82.13% 96.50% 95.76% 97.36%
SVHN 44.04% 90.21% 91.31% 91.84%
TABLE II: Resource utilization of Mixed/Parallel/Structure-
reduced Parallel MAT on FPGA, using CIFAR-10 dataset.
MACC Model Hardware Resource
# of Operations Size LUT FF BRAM DSP
Mixed MAT 12.3M 89.4k 27761 26600 75 220
Parallel MAT 49.3M 360.3k 139385 85172 390 900
Reduced 10.9M 57.1k 43118 34097 203 400
D. Design Exploration
We can reduce the cost of the parallel MAT down to the
same level as mixed MAT has by using simplified network
structure on each network copy. The accuracy result of one
example of such a reduced structure is presented in Figure 4(b)
as “parallel MAT: reduced structure”. As can be seen from
the figure, the parallel MAT with reduced-structure can still
achieve an overall higher accuracy than the original training,
but it fails to match the results of the two MATs (with full
structures). This result implies a possible tradeoff between
accuracy and hardware cost in parallel MAT design, which
will be further discussed in Section V-E.
Moreover, Figure 4(d) (SVHN) shows that mixed MAT with
reduced training data size shows much worse accuracy than
mixed MAT with the full training data size, which echoes the
result of Figure 2 in Section III. We note that for parallel
MAT, it is not sufficient for each network copies to learn
enough information if we further reduce the training data size.
Therefore, this option is beyond our consideration in design
exploration.
E. Implementation on FPGA Platforms
To give a more specific understanding on different models,
we evaluate the hardware implementation cost of different
designs based on their corresponding FPGA realizations that
are designed with Vivado HLS 2016.4. This tool initializes the
implementation with C language and then exports the RTL as
an IP core. Fast C/RTL co-simulation is used for design space
exploration and hardware resource estimation. The design is
deployed on a single FPGA and uses DRAM as external stor-
age. We use systolic arrays of uniformed processing elements
(PEs) as the main computing units with 32-bit floating-point
precision. The global control unit initializes the accelerator and
distributes kernel weights and feature maps to PEs at runtime.
The data from/to the external memory is handled by a multi-
port DMA streaming engine. Each PE is assigned with a subset
of the overall computation, the PE controller sets up registers
according to the received configuration instructions, and then
enables Data Fetcher to load vector arrays of an input feature
map into on-chip buffer at runtime. The PE also integrates
ReLU activation and Pooling function. After placement and
routing, the chip operates at 150 MHz.
Table II summarizes the resource utilization of different
network structures trained with CIFAR-10 on Xilinx ZC706
development board. “Reduced” in the table indicates “parallel
MAT: reduced structure” as in Figure 4(b). The comparison
between different models in terms of accuracy and hardware
cost shows that the bigger model size and higher computation
density the model has, the more robust it will be. But the
training time may not follow this rule because of the compu-
tation parallelism. These results could guide us to the tradeoff
between robustness, training time, and hardware cost, which
can facilitate the hardware designs in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we observe that single-strength adversarial
training demonstrates limited working range to enhance the
model’s resilience to adversarial attacks. Hence, we pro-
pose two multi-strength adversarial training (MAT) methods,
namely, mixed MAT and parallel MAT, to alleviate adversarial
attacks. Moreover, a random walk algorithm is adopted to
optimize the selections of the adversarial strengths that are
included in the two MAT methods. Our experimental results
on four different datasets show that compared to the single-
strength adversarial training method, both mixed MAT and
parallel MAT substantially improve DNN model’s resilience
to adversarial attacks. The results also indicate that higher
robustness can be achieved by higher computation density and
bigger model size, but the training time can be greatly reduced
by using computation parallelism on a FPGA platform.
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